经济愤怒瞄准非法石油收入助长伊朗军事美国财政部
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经济愤怒瞄准非法石油收入助长伊朗军事
2026 年 5 月 28 日
华盛顿——今天，美国财政部外国资产控制办公室 (OFAC) 正在对伊朗的军用石油销售采取进一步行动，这使得该政权有能力为其武装部队的重建提供资金，并对美国及其在该地区的伙伴构成持续的威胁。伊朗军方通过一系列幌子公司销售伊朗原油来获得收入，以帮助为其重建提供资金并威胁其邻国。
美国财政部长斯科特·贝森特表示，“财政部将继续加大对伊朗石油销售的压力，以剥夺伊朗政权及其军队威胁美国在中东的盟友和伙伴所需的财政资源。” “我们不会允许伊朗政府为了重建武装部队和军事能力而增加石油收入。”
今天的行动是根据反恐当局修订后的第 13224 号行政命令 (E.O.) 采取的。它继续财政部针对伊朗石油销售的严厉制裁行动，以支持经济愤怒和总统国家安全总统备忘录 2 (NSPM-2)，对伊朗发起最大经济压力。
此外，美国国务院的司法奖励计划将对导致 IRGC 及其各分支机构财务机制破坏的信息提供高达 1500 万美元的奖励。更多信息请访问 RFJ 网站。
经济愤怒给伊朗带来最大压力
美国财政部正在对伊朗保持最大压力，并针对该政权产生、转移和汇回资金的能力。财政部正在积极推进“经济愤怒”，并扰乱了伊朗政权及其代理人无法获得的价值数百亿美元的收入。这包括导致近 5 亿美元与政权相关的加密货币被冻结的行动。此外，财政部还打击了德黑兰的全球影子银行网络；向伊朗供应武器和其他军事部件的指定网络；制裁一名腐败的伊拉克官员，该官员与伊朗支持的在伊拉克活动的民兵一起为石油销售提供便利；对伊朗的恐怖主义代理人采取了许多行动；并针对支持伊朗非法石油工业的影子舰队、公司和其他实体。
通过封锁，特朗普政府直接瞄准了该政权的主要收入来源。任何通过秘密贸易或金融渠道促进石油或其他商品非法贸易的个人或船只都有可能受到美国制裁。
财政部将继续大力打击传统的制裁逃避计划和数字资产的利用，同时继续冻结从伊朗人民那里窃取的资金。财政部还准备对任何支持伊朗非法商业的外国公司（包括航空公司）采取行动，并在必要时对为伊朗活动提供便利的外国金融机构实施二级制裁。
此外，财政部最近警告称，遵守伊朗通过霍尔木兹海峡的要求（例如“通行费”支付）相关的制裁风险，包括通过法定货币、数字资产、抵消、非正式互换或其他实物支付（例如名义上的慈善捐赠）以及提供敏感船只信息进行的支付。 2026 年 5 月 27 日，美国财政部指定了伊朗所谓的“波斯湾海峡管理局”，这是一个与 IRGC 相关的计划，旨在勒索寻求通过霍尔木兹海峡的国际航运。
伊朗军用石油销售
Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars公司（Sepehr Energy Jahan）是伊朗武装部队总参谋部的石油销售部门，仍然是伊朗原油和石油出口网络的关键节点。 Sepehr Energy Jahan 的石油出口依赖于愿意运输军方石油的影子舰队船只。在整个 2024 年底和 2025 年初，Sepehr Energy Jahan 使用阿拉伯联合酋长国 (UAE) 的船舶租赁公司 Luan Bird Shipping Service LLC (Luan Bird) 将伊朗石油运往中国，并向总部位于香港的 Growth Trading Co., Limited 支付佣金，因为该公司在受制裁船舶 BOREAS（IMO 9248497；现为 URI）、SIRI（IMO）上的 Sepehr Energy Jahan 原油运输中发挥了作用9281683）和 OXIS（IMO 9224805）。
同样，总部位于香港的大麦科技发展有限公司（以下简称“大麦科技”）自 2025 年中期以来，代表伊朗武装部队（包括伊斯兰革命卫队）担任多艘运载伊朗石油的船只的承租人。
Growth Trading Co., Limited 和 Damai Technology Development Limited 已根据 E.O. 被指定。 13224（经修订），为 Sepehr Energy Jahan 提供实质协助、赞助或提供财务、物质或技术支持，或商品或服务或支持其支持。
除了利用幌子公司租船外，Sepehr Energy Jahan 还利用幌子公司在伊朗石油出口供应链中扮演许多其他角色。总部位于香港的 Tida Co., Limited 是 Sepehr Energy Jahan 的幌子公司，经常充当伊朗军用石油货物的托运人和收货人。 2024年初，泰达有限公司用“HECATE”号（当时称为“ATILAN”号）将近200万桶、价值超过1亿美元的伊朗原油运往中国董家口。 2025年初，Sepehr Energy Jahan利用Tida Co., Limited通过SIRI向大连运送了近200万桶伊朗原油。
Sepehr Energy Jahan 的另一家幌子公司、总部位于香港的 Mehdiyev Trading Co., Limited（Mehdiyev Trading）也同样代表伊朗武装部队协助将伊朗原油运往中国。 2024 年全年，美国指定的 Sepehr Energy Jahan 幌子公司 Star Energy International Limited 向 Mehdiyev Trading 多次付款。这些付款金额与梅赫迪耶夫贸易公司为储存在中国青岛岸上油罐中的伊朗石油支付的仓储费和其他港口费一致，而石油等待最终交付给中国买家。
受制裁的伊朗实体还利用伊朗武装部队的石油销售基础设施从伊朗境外采购石油产品。例如，总部位于香港的Worth Seen Energy Limited代表Sepehr Energy Jahan为NIOC采购精炼石油产品。 2025年1月，Worth Seen Energy Limited向NIOC提供了数十万桶汽油，在阿联酋装载并运往伊朗阿巴斯港。
Tida Co., Limited、Mehdiyev Trading Co., Limited 和 Worth Seen Energy Limited 已根据 E.O. 被指定。经修订的第 13224 条，由 Sepehr Energy Jahan 直接或间接拥有、控制或指导，或者直接或间接为 Sepehr Energy Jahan 行事或声称为 Sepehr Energy Jahan 行事。
制裁的影响
由于今天的行动，上述指定或被封锁人员在美国境内或由美国人拥有或控制的所有财产和财产权益均被封锁，并且必须向 OFAC 报告。此外，由一名或多名被封锁人员直接或间接、单独或合计拥有 50% 或以上股份的任何实体也将被封锁。除非获得 OFAC 颁发的一般或特定许可证授权或豁免，否则 OFAC 的法规一般禁止美国人或在美国境内（或过境）进行涉及被封锁人员的任何财产或财产权益的所有交易。
违反美国制裁可能会导致美国和外国企业受到民事或刑事处罚
[正文过长，已截取前部进行翻译]
Economic Fury Targets Illicit Oil Revenue Fueling Iran’s Military | U.S. Department of the Treasury
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Economic Fury Targets Illicit Oil Revenue Fueling Iran’s Military
May 28, 2026
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking additional action against Iran’s military oil sales, which is enabling the regime’s ability to fund the rebuilding of its armed forces and pose continued threats to the United States and its partners in the region. Iran’s military generates revenue through Iranian crude oil sales via an array of front companies to help fund its reconstitution and threaten its neighbors.
"The Treasury Department will continue to increase pressure on Iranian oil sales to deprive the Iranian regime and its military of the financial resources it needs to threaten U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. "We will not allow the Iranian government to increase its oil revenue for the purpose of reconstituting its armed forces and military capabilities."
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. It continues Treasury’s robust sanctions campaign targeting Iranian oil sales in support of Economic Fury and the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), instituting a campaign of maximum economic pressure on Iran.
Additionally, the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program is offering a reward of up to $15 million for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of the IRGC and its various branches. More information is available on the RFJ website.
ECONOMIC FURY DELIVERS MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN
The Treasury Department is maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and targeting the regime’s ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds. Treasury is aggressively advancing Economic Fury and has disrupted tens of billions of dollars’ worth of revenue from being otherwise accessible to the Iranian regime and its proxies. This includes actions that have led to the freezing of nearly half a billion dollars in regime-linked cryptocurrency. In addition, Treasury has cracked down on Tehran’s global shadow banking networks; designated networks supplying weapons and other military components to Iran; sanctioned a corrupt Iraqi official who has facilitated the sale of oil along with Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq; taken numerous actions against Iran’s terrorist proxies; and targeted shadow fleet vessels, companies, and other entities that sustain Iran’s illicit oil industry.
Through the blockade, the Trump Administration is directly targeting the regime’s primary revenue stream. Any person or vessel facilitating the illicit trade of oil or other commodities, through covert trade or financial channels, risks exposure to U.S. sanctions.
Treasury will continue to vigorously target both traditional sanctions evasion schemes and the exploitation of digital assets while continuing to freeze funds stolen from the Iranian people. Treasury is also prepared to take action against any foreign company supporting illicit Iranian commerce, including airlines , and, as necessary, may impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate Iran’s activities.
Additionally, Treasury recently warned of the sanctions risk associated with complying with Iranian demands for passage through the Strait of Hormuz such as “toll” payments , including payments made via fiat currency, digital assets, offsets, informal swaps, or other in-kind payments such as nominally charitable donations, and providing sensitive vessel information. On May 27, 2026, Treasury designated Iran’s so-called “Persian Gulf Strait Authority,” an IRGC-linked scheme to extort international shipping seeking to transit the Strait of Hormuz.
IRANIAN MILITARY OIL SALES
Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (Sepehr Energy Jahan), the oil sales arm of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, remains a key node in Iran’s crude oil and petroleum export network. Sepehr Energy Jahan’s oil exports depend on access to shadow fleet vessels willing to transport the military’s oil. Throughout late 2024 and early 2025, Sepehr Energy Jahan used United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based vessel chartering company Luan Bird Shipping Service LLC (Luan Bird) to ship Iranian oil to China and to pay commissions to Hong Kong-based Growth Trading Co., Limited for its role in Sepehr Energy Jahan crude oil shipments aboard the sanctioned vessels BOREAS (IMO 9248497; now URI), SIRI (IMO 9281683), and OXIS (IMO 9224805).
Similarly, Hong Kong-based Damai Technology Development Limited (Damai Technology)has served as the charterer of multiple vessels carrying Iranian oil on behalf of the Iranian armed forces since mid-2025, including the IRGC.
Growth Trading Co., Limited and Damai Technology Development Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sepehr Energy Jahan.
In addition to using front companies to charter vessels, Sepehr Energy Jahan also uses front companies to serve numerous other roles in Iran’s oil export supply chain. Hong Kong-based Tida Co., Limited is a Sepehr Energy Jahan front company that frequently serves as the shipper and consignee of Iran’s military oil cargoes. In early 2024, Tida Co., Limited shipped nearly two million barrels of Iranian crude oil, worth over $100 million, to Dongjiakou, China, on board the HECATE, then known as the ATILAN. In early 2025, Sepehr Energy Jahan used Tida Co., Limited to deliver nearly two million barrels of Iranian crude oil on board the SIRI to Dalian.
Hong Kong-based Mehdiyev Trading Co., Limited (Mehdiyev Trading), another Sepehr Energy Jahan front company, has likewise facilitated the shipment of Iranian crude oil to China on behalf of the Iranian armed forces. Throughout 2024, U.S.-designated Sepehr Energy Jahan front company Star Energy International Limited made multiple payments to Mehdiyev Trading. These payment amounts coincided with the storage and other port fees Mehdiyev Trading paid for Iranian oil stored in shore tanks in Qingdao, China while the oil awaited final delivery to Chinese buyers.
Sanctioned Iranian entities also use the Iranian armed forces’ oil sales infrastructure to procure oil products from outside Iran. For example, Hong Kong-based Worth Seen Energy Limited procures refined petroleum products for NIOC on behalf of Sepehr Energy Jahan. In January 2025, Worth Seen Energy Limited supplied NIOC with hundreds of thousands of barrels of gasoline, loaded in the UAE and transported to Bandar Abbas, Iran.
Tida Co., Limited, Mehdiyev Trading Co., Limited, and Worth Seen Energy Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Energy Jahan.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked person described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List .
Click here for more information on the persons designated today .
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