财政部瞄准为伊朗政权采购武器的全球网络

财政部瞄准为伊朗政权采购武器的全球网络美国财政部
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财政部瞄准为伊朗政权采购武器的全球网络
2026 年 7 月 15 日
华盛顿——今天，在伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡袭击商船之后，美国财政部外国资产控制办公室 (OFAC) 对参与代表伊斯兰革命卫队 (IRGC) 武器采购工作的国际网络的七名个人和实体实施了制裁。今天被指认的行为者体现了伊朗利用外国航空和运输公司、金融渠道和旅行协调员来掩盖伊朗革命卫队在非法采购以及在全球范围内转移物资和人员方面的作用。 OFAC 将继续扰乱维持伊朗武器生产和扩散活动的海外采购和金融网络，这威胁着美国以及美国在全球的合作伙伴和盟友。
“特朗普总统已经明确表示，伊朗必须实现无核化，”财政部长斯科特·贝森特表示。 “财政部将继续瞄准并破坏为伊朗武器计划和战争机器提供资金的非法采购网络。”
今天的行动建立在 OFAC 2026 年 5 月 8 日和 2026 年 6 月 10 日的指定基础上，该指定的目标包括为 IRGC 和伊朗创新与技术合作中心 (CITC) 采购武器的采购网络，包括便携式防空系统 (MANPADS)。 OFAC 根据第 13382 号行政命令 (E.O.) 行事，该命令针对大规模杀伤性武器 (WMD) 扩散者及其支持者。美国国务院根据 E.O. 指定了 IRGC。 2007 年 10 月针对伊朗弹道导弹计划签署了第 13382 号决议，今天的行动推进了国家安全总统备忘录 2，该备忘录指示美国政府拒绝 IRGC 获取维持其破坏稳定活动的资产和资源。
伊斯兰革命卫队采购网络
伊朗国民 Behrouz Namazi (Namazi) 是 Nika Jet Company 的总经理，该公司是一家位于德黑兰的飞机零部件和无人机生产、分销和维护服务提供商。纳马齐一直试图代表伊斯兰革命卫队获取武器。总部位于尼日利亚的先锋战术供应有限公司（Vanguard Tactical Supply）是纳马齐努力的中间人，而总部位于米兰的意大利国民杜尼亚·埃泰布（Ettaib）是纳马齐采购武器活动的知情参与者。
俄罗斯国民玛丽亚·弗拉基米罗夫娜·塞琳娜（Selina）是伊朗的长期采购代理人。 Selina 是总部位于莫斯科的航空运输公司 Avratek OOO (Avratek) 的财务部主管，代表 IRGC 支持 Namazi 的采购工作。俄罗斯公民 Vadim Anatolyevich Druzhbin (Druzhbin) 也是 Avratek 的员工，负责协调 Namazi 和 Selina 的旅行。德鲁日宾此前曾参与协调伊朗的运输。
Namazi 和 Selina 已根据 E.O. 被指认。 13382 为伊斯兰革命卫队提供或试图提供财务、物质、技术或其他支持，或支持伊朗革命卫队的货物或服务。 Nika Jet 根据 E.O. 被指定13382 直接或间接为 Namazi 所有或控制，或为或声称为或代表 Namazi 行事。 Vanguard Tactical Supply、Ettaib 和 Avratek 已根据 E.O. 被指定。 13382 曾为 Namazi 提供或试图提供财务、物质、技术或其他支持，或支持 Namazi 的商品或服务。 Druzhbin 是根据 E.O. 被指定的。 13382 直接或间接为 Avratek 行事或声称为 Avratek 行事或代表 Avratek 行事。
制裁的影响
由于今天的行动，上述被指定或被阻止的人员在美国境内或由美国人拥有或控制的所有财产和财产权益均被冻结，并且必须向 OFAC 报告。此外，由一名或多名被封锁人员直接或间接、单独或合计拥有 50% 或以上股份的任何实体也将被封锁。除非获得 OFAC 授权或豁免，OFAC 的法规一般禁止美国人或在美国境内（或过境）进行所有涉及被封锁人士的任何财产或财产权益的交易。
违反美国制裁可能会导致美国和外国人受到民事或刑事处罚。 OFAC 可以在严格责任的基础上对违反制裁行为处以民事处罚。 OFAC 的经济制裁执行指南提供了有关 OFAC 执行美国经济制裁的更多信息。此外，金融机构和其他人员可能会因参与涉及指定人员或以其他方式被封锁的人员的某些交易或活动而面临受到制裁的风险。这些禁令包括由任何指定或被阻止的人员向任何指定或被封锁的人员或为其利益提供任何捐款或提供资金、商品或服务，或从任何此类人员处接受任何捐款或提供资金、商品或服务。非美国还禁止任何人导致或密谋导致美国人有意或无意违反美国制裁，以及从事逃避美国制裁的行为。位于美国或国外的向 FinCEN 举报人奖励计划提供有关违反制裁行为的信息的个人，如果他们提供的信息导致成功的举报，则可能有资格获得奖励。
导致罚款超过 1,000,000 美元的强制行动。
此外，参与今天指定人员的某些交易可能会面临对参与的外国金融机构实施二级制裁的风险。 OFAC 可以禁止或施加严格条件，禁止在美国开设或维持外国金融机构的代理账户或应付账户，如果该外国金融机构故意代表根据相关机构指定的人员进行或促进任何重大交易。
OFAC 制裁的力量和完整性不仅源于 OFAC 指定和添加人员到 SDN 名单的能力，还源于其愿意依法从 SDN 名单中删除人员。制裁的最终目的不是惩罚，而是带来行为的积极改变。有关寻求从 OFAC 名单（包括 SDN 名单）中删除的流程或提交请求的信息，请参阅 OFAC 关于提交从 OFAC 名单中删除申请的指南。
单击此处了解有关今天指定人员的更多信息。
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Treasury Targets Global Network Procuring Weapons for Iranian Regime | U.S. Department of the Treasury
Press Releases
Treasury Targets Global Network Procuring Weapons for Iranian Regime
July 15, 2026
WASHINGTON— Today, following Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned seven individuals and entities involved in an international network supporting weapons procurement efforts on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The actors designated today exemplify Iran’s use of foreign aviation and transport firms, financial conduits, and travel coordinators to obscure the IRGC’s role in illicit procurement and to move material and personnel globally. OFAC will continue to disrupt the overseas procurement and financial networks that sustain Iran’s weapons production and proliferation efforts, which threaten Americans and U.S. partners and allies worldwide.
“President Trump has been clear that Iran must denuclearize,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “Treasury will continue to target and disrupt the illicit procurement networks that fund Iran’s weapons programs and war machine.”
Today’s action builds on OFAC’s May 8, 2026 and June 10, 2026 designations, which targeted, among others, procurement networks that sourced weapons for the IRGC and Iran’s Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS). OFAC is acting pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters. The U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile program, and today’s action advances National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 , which directs the U.S. government to deny the IRGC access to assets and resources that sustain its destabilizing activities.
IRGC PROCUREMENT NETWORK
Iranian national Behrouz Namazi (Namazi) is the general director of Nika Jet Company , a Tehran-based provider of services for the production, distribution, and maintenance of aircraft parts and drones. Namazi has sought to secure weapons on behalf of the IRGC. Nigeria-based Vanguard Tactical Supply Limited (Vanguard Tactical Supply) is an intermediary for Namazi’s efforts, and Milan-based Italian national Dounia Ettaib (Ettaib) is a witting participant in efforts to procure weapons for Namazi.
Russian national Mariya Vladimirovna Selina (Selina) is a longtime procurement agent for Iran. Selina is the head of the financial department at Avratek OOO (Avratek), an aviation transportation company based in Moscow, and has supported Namazi’s procurement efforts on behalf of the IRGC. Russian national Vadim Anatolyevich Druzhbin (Druzhbin) is also an employee at Avratek and has coordinated travel for Namazi and Selina. Druzhbin has previously been involved in coordinating Iranian shipments.
Namazi and Selina are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC. Nika Jet is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Namazi. Vanguard Tactical Supply, Ettaib, and Avratek are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Namazi. Druzhbin is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Avratek.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List .
Click here for more information on the persons designated today .
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