财政部瞄准主要最高领导人金融家和伊朗影子交易所美国财政部
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财政部瞄准主要最高领导人金融家和伊朗影子交易所
2026 年 7 月 10 日
华盛顿——今天，在伊朗恢复对霍尔木兹海峡国际航运的袭击之后，美国财政部外国资产控制办公室 (OFAC) 对伊朗金融服务商阿里·安萨里 (Ansari) 采取了行动，后者监管着一个庞大的全球资产网络，有利于伊朗领导人莫伊塔巴·哈梅内伊 (Mojtaba Khamenei) 和其他政权精英。安萨里在伊朗政权内部有效地制度化了大规模贪污行为，将公共资助的财富转移到广泛的海外房地产和商业资产投资组合中，为自己、政权精英（包括最高领袖办公室内的知名高级人物）和伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）致富。 OFAC 今天还针对每年代表受制裁伊朗银行转移数十亿美元的主要伊朗交易所，利用层层空壳公司来掩盖该政权的非法金融活动。
“当他的政权崩溃时，所谓的最高领袖却躲藏起来，”财政部长斯科特·贝森特说。 “财政部将继续使用一切可用工具将他和其他政权精英与全球金融体系隔离。我们将为伊朗人民保留这些资产。”
今天的行动是根据 E.O. 采取的。 13902，针对伊朗金融和石油部门的人员，E.O. 13876，重点关注伊朗最高领袖及其附属机构以及反恐机构 E.O. 13224，经 E.O. 修订。 13886（“E.O. 13224，经修订”）。这些指定建立在 OFAC 针对伊朗影子银行和货币兑换机构网络的一系列行动之上。
最高领导人办公室的主要资助者
居住在迪拜的伊朗国民阿里·安萨里因在伊朗政权内部将贪污制度化而名声大噪，随后积累了一个全球投资地产和金融控股网络，这既代表莫杰塔巴·哈梅内伊，也为了自身利益，利用与政权精英的密切关系，以牺牲伊朗人民为代价，为自己和盟友谋取利益。
安萨里此前是受美国制裁、现已破产并解散的阿扬德银行 (Ayandeh Bank) 的所有者和董事，他利用这一职位过度发放贷款，从伊朗人民挪用数十亿美元，直到伊朗政府于 2025 年 10 月中旬强制解散该银行。阿扬德银行 (Ayandeh Bank) 在伊朗中央银行向安萨里自己的公司和商业企业发放由伊朗中央银行支持的贷款时，负债累累。伊朗。虽然安萨里的贪污行为对伊朗经济造成了难以估量的损害，而且已经飙升的通货膨胀影响了普通伊朗人的日常生活，但安萨里正在利用他的公共资助的财富，同时代表莫杰塔巴·哈梅内伊扩张海外商业帝国。
Ansari 利用众多空壳公司和跨多个司法管辖区的银行账户，在总部位于圣基茨和尼维斯的 Smart Global Limited 下积累了价值数百万美元的股份，该控股公司于 2011 年成立，原名为 Ziba Leisure Limited。通过 Smart Global Limited，Ansari 将伊朗人民的资金投资到德国、卢森堡、西班牙、英国、塞浦路斯、阿拉伯联合酋长国等地的房地产和商业地产。虽然这些经济利益以安萨里的名义持有，但其中许多经济利益最终都是为了莫杰塔巴·哈梅内伊、他的家人以及伊朗政权和伊斯兰革命卫队的其他精英的经济利益而持有的，尽管安萨里公然腐败并对伊朗经济和人民造成了重大损害，但他们保护安萨里免受惩罚。
Ali Ansari 根据 E.O. 被指定13876 为 Mojtaba Khamenei 提供物质协助、赞助或提供财务、物质或技术支持，或向 Mojtaba Khamenei 提供商品或服务，或支持 Mojtaba Khamenei，以及根据 E.O. 13224（经修订），直接或间接为或声称为或代表伊斯兰革命卫队行事。 Smart Global Limited 根据 E.O. 被指定13876 直接或间接为 Ali Ansari 所有或控制，或曾为或声称为 Ali Ansari 或代表 Ali Ansari 行事，并根据 E.O. 13876 13224（经修订），由 Ali Ansari 直接或间接拥有、控制或指导，或者直接或间接为 Ali Ansari 行事或声称为 Ali Ansari 行事或代表 Ali Ansari 行事。
伊朗交易所
伊朗的国际银行活动严重依赖位于伊朗的货币兑换所，这些兑换所代表伊朗银行客户持有和转移资金。这些交易所通常是由至少两个人组成的家族经营的“普通合伙”公司，其中公司合伙人对银行委托给他们的资金承担最终责任。
Mohammad Darbani、Shokufeh Rostam Abadi 和 Zahra Sarshari 是伊朗交易所 Mohammad Darbani 和 Partners Exchange General Partnership Company 的控股合伙人，该公司在过去几年中代表受制裁的伊朗银行促进了数亿美元的外币交易。截至 2026 年初，达巴尼交易所代表其受制裁的伊朗银行客户持有价值数千万美元的外币。 Shokufeh Rostam Abadi 是交易所的首席执行官 (CEO)，Mohammad Darbani 是董事会主席，Zahra Sarshari 是董事会成员。
Ahmad Navai Lavasani 和 Amir Navai Lavasani 是伊朗交易所 Lavasani and Partners General Partnership Company 的控股合伙人，该公司已与受制裁的伊朗银行 Bank Melli、Bank Saderat、Sina Bank、Shahr Bank、Eghtesad Novin Bank、Tourism Bank、Bank Pasargad 和 Bank Mellat 签订了合同。截至 2026 年初，拉瓦萨尼交易所代表其受制裁的伊朗银行客户持有价值数亿美元的外币，并在过去几年中代表受制裁的伊朗银行促进了数亿美元的外币交易。 Ahmad Navai Lavasani 是交易所首席执行官，Amir Navai Lavasani 是董事会主席。
Mohsen Khandan 和 Ali Asghar Khandan 是伊朗交易所 Mohsen Khandan and Partners General Partnership Company 的控股合伙人，该公司已与受制裁的伊朗银行 Parsian Bank、Export Development Bank、Bank Saderat、Bank Sepah、Sina Bank、Karafarin Bank、Saman Bank 和 Tejarat Bank 签订了合同。 Khandan Exchange 代表受制裁的伊朗银行持有超过 1.17 亿美元的外币。 Mohsen Khandan 是交易所首席执行官，Ali Asghar Khandan 是唯一的其他合伙人兼董事会成员。
Mohammad Darbani 和 Partners Exchange 普通合伙公司、Lavasani 和 Partners 普通合伙公司以及 Mohsen Khandan 和 Partners 普通合伙公司根据 E.O. 被指定。 13902 从事伊朗经济金融部门的运营。 Mohammad Darbani、Shokufeh Rostam Abadi 和 Zahra Sarshari 根据 E.O. 被指定。 13902 直接或间接代表 Mohammad Darbani 和 Partners Exchange General Partnership Company 行事。 Ahmad Navai Lavasani 和 Amir Navai Lavasani 根据 E.O. 被指定。 13902 直接或间接代表 Lavasani and Partners 普通合伙公司行事。 Mohsen Khandan 和 Ali Asghar Khandan 已根据 E.O. 被指认。 13902 直接或间接代表 Mohsen Khandan and Partners General Partnership Company 行事。
这些交换所 mov
[正文过长，已截取前部进行翻译]
Treasury Targets Key Supreme Leader Financier and Iran’s Shadow Exchange Houses | U.S. Department of the Treasury
Press Releases
Treasury Targets Key Supreme Leader Financier and Iran’s Shadow Exchange Houses
July 10, 2026
WASHINGTON —Today, following Iran’s resumption of attacks on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against Iranian financial facilitator Ali Ansari (Ansari) , who oversees a sprawling global network of assets benefitting Iran’s leader—Mojtaba Khamenei—and other regime elites. Ansari has effectively institutionalized large‑scale embezzlement within the Iranian regime, diverting publicly funded wealth into an extensive overseas portfolio of real estate and commercial holdings to enrich himself, regime elites—including notable senior figures within the Supreme Leader’s Office—and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). OFAC today also targeted key Iranian exchange houses that move billions of dollars annually on behalf of sanctioned Iranian banks, using layers of shell companies to obscure the regime’s illicit financial activity.
“The so-called Supreme Leader is hiding in seclusion while his regime crumbles,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “Treasury will continue using every tool at its disposal to isolate him and other regime elites from the global financial system. We will preserve these assets for the Iranian people.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to E.O. 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran’s financial and petroleum sectors, E.O. 13876, which focuses on the Supreme Leader of Iran and his affiliates, and the counterterrorism authority E.O. 13224, as amended by E.O. 13886 (“E.O. 13224, as amended”). These designations build on a series of OFAC actions targeting Iranian shadow banking and currency exchange house networks.
key FINANCIER for the SUPREME LEADER’s office
Dubai-based Iranian national Ali Ansari has made a name for himself by institutionalizing embezzlement within the Iranian regime and has subsequently amassed a global network of investment properties and financial holdings, both on behalf of Mojtaba Khamenei and for his own self-serving interests by using his close ties to regime elites to enrich himself and his allies at the expense of the Iranian people.
Ansari was previously the owner and director of the U.S. sanctioned and now bankrupt and defunct Ayandeh Bank , and he used this position to overextend loans and embezzle billions of dollars from the Iranian people until the Iranian government forced the bank’s dissolution in mid-October 2025. Ayandeh Bank racked up billions in debt as it issued loans backed by the Central Bank of Iran to Ansari’s own companies and commercial ventures in Iran. While Ansari’s embezzlement was causing untold damage to Iran’s economy and the already soaring inflation affecting the daily lives of ordinary Iranians, Ansari was using his publicly funded wealth to simultaneously expand an overseas business empire on behalf of Mojtaba Khamenei.
Using numerous shell companies and bank accounts across multiple jurisdictions, Ansari has accumulated millions of dollars’ worth of holdings under the Saint Kitts and Nevis-based Smart Global Limited , a holding company established in 2011 under the former name Ziba Leisure Limited. Through Smart Global Limited, Ansari has invested the Iranian people’s money into real estate and commercial properties throughout Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, the United Kingdom, Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, and beyond. Although held in Ansari’s name, many of these financial interests are ultimately held for the financial benefit of Mojtaba Khamenei, his family, and other Iranian elites in the regime and the IRGC who have protected Ansari from facing punishment despite his blatant corruption and the significant damage he has caused to the Iranian economy and people.
Ali Ansari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13876 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mojtaba Khamenei, as well as pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC. Smart Global Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13876 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ali Ansari, and pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ali Ansari.
Iranian Exchange Houses
Iran’s international banking activities are heavily reliant on Iran-based currency exchange houses which hold and move money on behalf of their Iranian bank customers. These exchange houses are often family-run “general partnership” companies formed by at least two individuals, wherein the company partners are ultimately liable for the funds with which they are entrusted by the banks.
Mohammad Darbani , Shokufeh Rostam Abadi , and Zahra Sarshari are the controlling partners of Iranian exchange house Mohammad Darbani and Partners Exchange General Partnership Company , which has facilitated transactions moving hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign currency on behalf of sanctioned Iranian banks over the last several years. As of early 2026, Darbani Exchange held tens of millions of dollars’ worth of foreign currency on behalf of its sanctioned Iranian bank customers. Shokufeh Rostam Abadi is the exchange house’s chief executive officer (CEO) while Mohammad Darbani is the chairman of the board of directors and Zahra Sarshari is a board member.
Ahmad Navai Lavasani and Amir Navai Lavasani are the controlling partners of Iranian exchange house Lavasani and Partners General Partnership Company , which has entered into contracts with sanctioned Iranian banks Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, Sina Bank, Shahr Bank, Eghtesad Novin Bank, Tourism Bank, Bank Pasargad, and Bank Mellat. As of early 2026, Lavasani Exchange held hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of foreign currency on behalf of its sanctioned Iranian bank customers and has facilitated transactions moving hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign currency on behalf of sanctioned Iranian banks over the last several years. Ahmad Navai Lavasani is the exchange house CEO and Amir Navai Lavasani is the chairman of the board of directors.
Mohsen Khandan and Ali Asghar Khandan are the controlling partners of Iranian exchange house Mohsen Khandan and Partners General Partnership Company , which has entered into contracts with sanctioned Iranian banks Parsian Bank, Export Development Bank, Bank Saderat, Bank Sepah, Sina Bank, Karafarin Bank, Saman Bank, and Tejarat Bank. Khandan Exchange holds over $117 million in foreign currency on behalf of sanctioned Iranian banks. Mohsen Khandan is the exchange house CEO and Ali Asghar Khandan is the only other partner and board member.
Mohammad Darbani and Partners Exchange General Partnership Company, Lavasani and Partners General Partnership Company, and Mohsen Khandan and Partners General Partnership Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy. Mohammad Darbani, Shokufeh Rostam Abadi, and Zahra Sarshari are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for acting for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mohammad Darbani and Partners Exchange General Partnership Company. Ahmad Navai Lavasani and Amir Navai Lavasani are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for acting for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Lavasani and Partners General Partnership Company. Mohsen Khandan and Ali Asghar Khandan are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for acting for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mohsen Khandan and Partners General Partnership Company.
These exchange houses move and maintain the equivalent of billions of dollars annually on behalf of sanctioned Iranian banks, which transact through vast layers of cover and shell companies that conceal the sanctioned Iranian commercial parties ultimately behind these transactions. Hong Kong-based CDM Trading Limited is a front company which has been used to conduct financial transactions by multiple Iranian exchange houses, to include Mohsen Khandan and Partners General Partnership Company. Similarly, Naba Alzaki Raw Materials Trading LLC is a UAE-based front company which has been used by Mohsen Khandan and Partners General Partnership Company as part of Iran’s rahbar network.
CDM Trading Limited and Naba Alzaki Raw Materials Trading LLC are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List .
Click here for more information on the persons designated today .
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