Neo 创始人达鸿飞发布了 Neo 基金会的重组提案，将其视为对他所说的该项目治理拐点的回应。根据该文件，Neo 两位创始人之间的分歧导致了在战略、结构、支出和领导力等问题上的决策僵局。 Da 认为，当前的基金会模式不再适合公共区块链生态系统的需求，并提出了更广泛的制度重新设计，旨在减少创始人依赖并增加代币持有者的影响力。该文件是一项治理提案，而不是已采纳的社区决策。如果继续实施，将取决于 Neo 生态系统内的进一步讨论、法律工作、技术开发和相关治理流程。 Da 在提案中表示，Neo 的链上治理仍然受到基金会控制的代币的严重影响，而更广泛的代币持有者群体的参与仍然有限。他将这些问题描述为结构性问题，而不是暂时性的，并呼吁将 Neo 基金会重新设计成他所说的一个独立于创始人、具有更大合法性的管理机构。
l 清晰度、财务透明度和代币持有者问责制。该计划的核心部分是将 Neo 基金会从目前的新加坡有限担保公司结构迁至一家无会员的开曼群岛基金会公司。 Da认为，现有的2018年成立的新加坡实体从未发挥过Neo生态系统真正的金库、运营中心或治理中心的作用，并且当前1:1的创始人会员模式造成了持续的僵局风险。在拟议的开曼结构下，治理将通过定制的宪法文件而不是股东或成员控制来定义。拟议的基金会将由五个席位的董事会和一名独立的专业监事进行监督。董事会将管理
Neo founder Da Hongfei has published a restructuring proposal for the Neo Foundation, framing it as a response to what he describes as a governance inflection point for the project.
According to the document, differences between Neo’s two founders have contributed to decision-making deadlock on issues including strategy, structure, spending, and leadership. Da argues that the current foundation model no longer fits the needs of a public blockchain ecosystem and proposes a broader institutional redesign aimed at reducing founder dependence and increasing tokenholder influence.
The document is a governance proposal rather than an adopted community decision. Its implementation, if pursued, would depend on further discussion, legal work, technical development, and relevant governance processes within the Neo ecosystem.
In the proposal, Da says Neo’s on-chain governance remains heavily influenced by foundation-controlled tokens, while participation from the broader tokenholder base remains limited. He describes these issues as structural rather than temporary and calls for the Neo Foundation to be redesigned into what he terms a founder-independent stewardship institution with greater legal clarity, financial transparency, and tokenholder accountability.
A central part of the plan is the redomiciliation of the Neo Foundation from its current Singapore company limited by guarantee structure to a memberless Cayman Islands foundation company. Da argues that the existing Singapore entity, established in 2018, has never functioned as the true treasury, operating center, or governance hub of the Neo ecosystem, and that the current 1:1 founder membership model creates persistent deadlock risk.
Under the proposed Cayman structure, governance would be defined through customized constitutional documents rather than shareholder or member control. The proposed foundation would be overseen by a five-seat Board of Directors and an independent professional Supervisor. The Board would manage strategy, budgets, delegated operators, and foundation assets, while the Supervisor would monitor compliance and could challenge or block board actions when necessary.
The proposal also states that neither Da Hongfei nor Erik Zhang should serve on the board or as supervisor during the first 24 months after redomiciliation. For the initial board, each founder would nominate four candidates, creating a pool of eight, from which community leaders and core developers would vote to select five directors. The document presents this process as a way to preserve founder input while preventing either side from unilaterally controlling the foundation’s future leadership.
The proposal also calls for a major change to Neo’s governance mechanics through time-locked staked voting. It argues that the current liquid voting system allows users to vote and unvote without cost, contributing to low engagement, opportunistic voting, proxy voting by exchanges or custodians, and weaker network security. To address this, the document recommends requiring tokenholders to stake NEO in order to vote, with a 180-day unbonding period. It also proposes redirecting GAS generation toward staked voters and making NEO divisible, with a separate Neo Improvement Proposal expected to cover the technical details.
Another major part of the plan is a “Giveback II” redistribution program. According to the document, the Neo Foundation and Neo Global Development collectively hold 41 million NEO and 40 million GAS, with 33 million NEO and 35 million GAS still under single-signature control. Under the proposal, reserved tokens would be redistributed through a strategic reserve for the foundation, allocations to existing community groups, and a tokenholder rebasing mechanism distributing around 26 million NEO plus around 40 million GAS proportionally to tokenholders.
The plan also calls for consolidating remaining financial and non-financial ecosystem assets under the restructured foundation, including cash, stablecoins, investments, receivables, domain names, trademarks, social media accounts, intellectual property, and code repositories. It further proposes a unified funding model and a shift toward financial self-sustainability through GAS revenue, asset-management income, and investment returns rather than sales of NEO for operating expenses.
The proposal lays out an implementation roadmap spanning about 12 months, beginning with legal restructuring and governance design, followed by asset transfers, technical development, and a combined upgrade covering staked voting, NEO divisibility, and Giveback II rebasing.
Taken together, the document outlines a broad restructuring blueprint for the Neo Foundation, spanning legal structure, governance design, voting mechanics, token redistribution, and asset consolidation.
In its closing section, the document describes itself not as a position paper but as a call to action directed at founders, community leaders, and tokenholders. Da argues that Neo’s founder relationship, once a source of cohesion, has become a constraint on progress, and that the resulting governance issues should be addressed through institutional redesign rather than personal negotiation. The proposal frames the restructuring not as a founder’s departure, but as an effort to create a governance structure through which long-term participation can continue on a more institutional basis.
The proposal was published against the backdrop of broader discussion within the Neo community around governance concentration, founder influence, and the long-term structure of the foundation. Whether the plan can secure broader support, and how other stakeholders respond to its governance, legal, and token redistribution proposals, remains to be seen.
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