Treasury Targets Iran’s Shadow Fleet, Networks Supplying Ballistic Missile and ACW Programs | U.S. Department of the Treasury
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Treasury Targets Iran’s Shadow Fleet, Networks Supplying Ballistic Missile and ACW Programs
February 25, 2026
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned over 30 individuals, entities, and vessels enabling illicit Iranian petroleum sales and Iran’s ballistic missile and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) production, as part of Treasury’s ongoing campaign of maximum pressure on Iran. Specifically, OFAC targeted additional vessels operating as part of Iran’s shadow fleet, which transport Iranian petroleum and petroleum products to foreign markets and serve as the regime’s primary source of revenue for financing domestic repression, terrorist proxies, and weapons programs. OFAC also targeted multiple networks that enable Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) to secure the precursor materials and sensitive machinery required to reconstitute ballistic missile and ACW production capacity, as well as proliferate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to third countries.
“Iran exploits financial systems to sell illicit oil, launder the proceeds, procure components for its nuclear and conventional weapons programs, and support its terrorist proxies,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Under President Trump’s strong leadership, Treasury will continue to put maximum pressure on Iran to target the regime’s weapons capabilities and support for terrorism, which it has prioritized over the lives of the Iranian people.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which authorizes sanctions on key sectors of Iran’s economy; E.O. 13382, which authorizes sanctions on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters; and E.O. 13949, which authorizes sanctions on property of certain persons with respect to the conventional arms activities of Iran.
This action is in furtherance of the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), which undergirds Treasury’s continued campaign of maximum economic pressure against Iran’s shadow banking, money laundering, weapons proliferation, and sanctions evasion networks and has impacted the Iranian regime’s ability to sell its petroleum to support its destabilizing behavior and recoup those funds. In 2025, OFAC sanctioned more than 875 persons, vessels, and aircraft as part of this campaign.
SHADOW FLEET VESSELS TRANSPORTING IRANIAN PETROLEUM
Today, OFAC intensified pressure on the Iranian shadow fleet, targeting 12 shadow fleet vessels and their respective owners or operators that have collectively transported hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products. Instead of allocating this revenue for the benefit of the Iranian people, the regime ultimately siphons it off to fund regional terrorist proxies, weapons programs, and repressive security services, rather than the basic economic needs the Iranian people have repeatedly and courageously demanded.
The following vessels are linked to years of transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical shipments, including significant volumes in 2025 that continue into 2026:
The Panama-flagged HOOT (IMO 9267962), owned by Panama-based Poros Maritime Ventures S.A. , transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian liquified petroleum gas (LPG) to Bangladesh in 2025.
The Barbados-flagged OCEAN KOI (IMO 9255933), owned by Marshall Island-based Ocean Kudos Shipping Co Ltd , has transported millions of barrels of Iranian high sulfur fuel oil (HSFO) and condensate since May 2025. The OCEAN KOI has operated as part of the Iranian shadow fleet since at least 2020.
The Barbados-flagged NORTH STAR (IMO 9299563), owned by British Virgin Islands-based Mistral Fleet Co Ltd , has transported nearly two million barrels of Iranian HSFO since late 2025.
The Comoros-flagged FELICITA (IMO 9167162), owned, operated, and managed by Liberia-registered Vast Marine Inc , has transported millions of barrels of Iranian HSFO and naphtha since 2023.
The Iran-flagged ATEELA 1 (IMO 9548990) and ATEELA 2 (IMO 9549009), owned by Iran-based Behengam Tadbir Qeshm Shipping and Maritime Services Company , has transported over 100,000 barrels of Iranian petroleum products for the National Iranian Oil Company since late 2025.
The Palau-flagged NIBA (IMO 9046784), owned, operated, and managed by Panama-based Paros Maritime S.A. , has transported millions of barrels of Iranian LPG, including butane and propane, since 2025. The NIBA has operated as part of the Iranian shadow fleet since at least 2020.
The Vanuatu-flagged LUMA (IMO 9034690), owned by Marshall Island-based Wansa Gas Shipping Co. , has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian LPG to end users in Bangladesh and Pakistan since late 2025. The LUMA previously carried Venezuelan LPG.
The Panama-flagged REMIZ (IMO 9223344), owned by Marshall Islands-based Goldwave Maritime Services Inc , has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil to East Asia since 2025.
The Palau-flagged DANUTA I (IMO 9193721), owned by Panama-based Ithaki Maritime and Trading S.A., has transported millions of barrels of Iranian LPG to East Asia since 2023.
The Palau-flagged ALAA (IMO 9155341), owned by Liberia-based Kaito Navigation SA , has transported dozens of Iranian LPG shipments to various jurisdictions, including Türkiye, since 2022. Kaito Navigation SA is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum and petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy.
The Panama-flagged GAS FATE (IMO 9147394), owned by Marshall Islands-based NYR Shipping Co. , has transported over a million barrels of Iranian grey ammonia to various jurisdictions since 2024. NYR Shipping Co. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petrochemical sector of the Iranian economy.
The following companies are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy:
Poros Maritime Ventures S.A.;
Ocean Kudos Shipping Co Ltd;
Mistral Fleet Co Ltd;
Vast Marine Inc;
Behengam Tadbir Qeshm Shipping and Maritime Services Company;
Paros Maritime S.A.;
Wansa Gas Shipping Co.;
Goldwave Maritime Services Inc; and
Ithaki Maritime and Trading S.A.
The following vessels are being identified as blocked property of the previously identified blocked persons:
HOOT (Poros Maritime Ventures S.A.);
OCEAN KOI (Ocean Kudos Shipping Co Ltd);
NORTH STAR (Mistral Fleet Co Ltd);
FELICITA (Vast Marine Inc);
ATEELA 1 and ATEELA 2 (Behengam Tadbir Qeshm Shipping and Maritime Services Company);
NIBA (Paros Maritime S.A.);
LUMA (Wansa Gas Shipping Co.);
REMIZ (Goldwave Maritime Services Inc);
DANUTA I (Ithaki Maritime and Trading S.A.);
ALAA (Kaito Navigation SA); and
GAS FATE (NYR Shipping Company).
NETWORKS SUPPLYING IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS
In furtherance of NSPM-2, OFAC also targeted nine individuals and entities based in Iran, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that have facilitated the procurement of precursor chemicals and sensitive machinery for the IRGC and MODAFL and their respective missile and ACW programs, as well as proliferated UAVs to third countries. In line with the Trump Administration’s commitment to sustaining maximum pressure on Iran, these sanctions seek to disrupt procurement networks that support Iran’s missile and UAV development, which Tehran continues to prioritize at the expense of the Iranian people. This action represents Treasury’s fourth round of nonproliferation designations in support of the September 27, 2025 reimposition of United Nations sanctions and other restrictions on Iran, which occurred as a direct result of Iran’s continued non-performance of its nuclear commitments.
Iran-based Oje Parvaz Mado Nafar Company (Mado) produces UAV engines used in Iran’s Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 UAVs. OFAC designated Mado pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2021 for having provided support to the IRGC.
Türkiye-based companies Utus Gumrukleme Gida Tekstil Ithalat Ihracat Dis Ticaret ve Sanayi Limited Sirketi (Utus), Arya Global Gida Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Arya), and Altis Tekstil Makina Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Altis) have served as financial intermediaries for Mado’s procurements. Utus has originated payments totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars in furtherance of Mado’s purchases of sensitive machinery for application in the IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization ’s (IRGC ASF SSJO’s) ACW platforms. Arya has originated transfers totaling more than $1 million in support of Mado’s purchases of sensitive machinery, and Altis has originated financial transactions worth tens of thousands of dollars in furtherance of Mado’s procurements.
On July 18, 2017, the U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC ASF SSJO, which is involved in Iranian ballistic missile research and flight test launches, pursuant to E.O. 13382 for engaging, or attempting to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.
Utus, Arya, and Altis are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Mado.
OFAC is also designating two companies for their support to Marco Klinge (Klinge), a U.S.‑designated individual who has coordinated and facilitated the procurement of materials, including the ballistic missile propellant precursor sodium perchlorate, for Iran’s Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI). Sodium perchlorate is used to manufacture the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-controlled chemical ammonium perchlorate. Ammonium perchlorate is used in solid propellant rocket motors, which are commonly used for ballistic missiles. OFAC designated Klinge pursuant to E.O. 13382 on November 12, 2025, for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PCI.
PCI is an element of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that is responsible for the import and export of chemical goods. OFAC designated PCI pursuant to E.O. 13382 in July 2008, and the Department of State designated DIO pursuant to E.O. 13382 in March 2007. Both DIO and PCI are also subject to an asset freeze pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and UNSCR 1747, respectively.
Iran-based Adak Pargas Pars Trading Company (Adak Pargas Pars) and UAE-based Mostafa Roknifard Prime Choice General Trading LLC (MRPCG Trading) have facilitated Klinge’s efforts to procure sodium perchlorate, including for Iranian government customers such as PCI.
Adak Pargas Pars and MRPCG Trading are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Klinge.
OFAC is designating four individuals based in Iran for their connection to Qods Aviation Industries (QAI), an element of Iran’s MODAFL. QAI designs and manufactures light and ultra‑light UAVs, including the Mohajer-2 in the mid-1990s and the Mohajer-6 in 2017. QAI has reportedly supplied UAVs to all branches of the Iranian military and buyers in Africa and Latin America. OFAC designated QAI pursuant to E.O. 13949 in October 2023. The U.S. Department of State designated MODAFL pursuant to E.O. 13949 in September 2020.
QAI employees Mohammad Abedini (Abedini) and Mehdi Zand (Zand) have traveled to Russia on behalf of QAI to provide support to resolve technical issues with QAI-designed, Mohajer-series UAVs for the Russian Federation. QAI employees Mehrdad Jafari (Jafari) and Ebrahim Shariatzadeh (Shariatzadeh) have traveled to Venezuela on behalf of QAI to provide UAV technical support.
Abedini, Zand, Jafari, and Shariatzadeh are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13949 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, QAI.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
All property and interests in property of the persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List .
Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked property today .
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